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SUMMARYThe recently adopted European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
(EGF) is an EU response to the challenge of globalisation. It is to spend
up to €500m annually supporting active labour market policies in
Member States targeting workers affected by trade-induced (mass)
layoffs. In principle, this EU effort to help trade-displaced workers makes
sense since trade policy is also decided at EU level. In practice, EGF rules
leave too much room for discretionary decisions, exposing it to political
posturing and lobbying. During its critical first few years, sound prece-
dents must be established, eligibility rules should be strengthened,
and rigorous evaluation should be built into the programme.Otherwise,
the EGF may come to be regarded as a political gimmick instead of a
useful European response to globalisation.
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Displaced workers often face unemploy-
ment, a lower-paying job, or a new job far
from home. Of these, the unemployed
typically receive most public support. We
propose that the EGF address this by
focusing its limited funds on two simple
active labour market schemes: wage
insurance and mobility allowance. Wage
insurance could offer workers whose pay
was cut after displacement a top-up for up
to two years amounting to half the diffe-
rence between the old and the new wage.
Those moving for a new job would receive
a lump-sum mobility allowance equal to
two months' gross pay in the previous job
(four months for cross-border moves).
These schemes should be scientifically
evaluated to decide on the extension of
the EGF when it expires in 2013.
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A  BETTER GLOBALISATION FUND
THE political sustainability of globa-
lisation is under threat. On both
sides of the Atlantic, global econo-
mic integration is seen as one core
factor in poor economic outcomes
for below-average earners. Public
opinion in France, the US, and
Germany – in this order – favours
keeping existing trade barriers, even
if it might result in slower growth
(see Figure 1). In the same poll,
around 60 percent of respondents
in both Europe and the US saw the
rise of China as a threat; only one
third saw it as an opportunity.
One of the underlying reasons for
the fragility of globalisation is that
globalisation creates large net
gains, but some lose out and many
more feel at risk. And in many OECD
countries, those who lose out or
who feel at risk already find them-
selves in the bottom half of the
income distribution. To accommo-
date this distributional impact of
globalisation, democratic societies
have to perform a delicate balan-
cing act involving redistribution
between winners and losers
1.
In the EU context, this raises the
question to what extent European
instruments can usefully support
these balancing acts by Member
States. The European Globalisation
Adjustment Fund (EGF), scheduled
to be operational from early 2007,
can be viewed as a litmus test in
this respect
2. Endowed with €500m
per year until 2013, it will fund
active labour market policies in
Member States which target wor-
kers affected by trade-induced col-
lective redundancies (see Box 1).
The proposed fund has some simi-
larities with the US Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA), first
introduced by the Kennedy admi-
nistration in 1962, the expansion of
which is being discussed in the US
3.
Section 1 provides the political
context by summarising key argu-
ments leading up to the establish-
ment of the EGF in December 2006.
In Section 2, the basic facts regar-
ding displaced and trade-displaced
workers in particular are presented.
Section 3 discusses the advantage
of sharp-edged rules for the EGF as
1e.g. Frieden (2007).
2Direct EU support to
individual trade displa-
ced workers had
already been proposed
in Sapir et al. (2003).
3Kletzer and Rosen
(2005); Brainard et al.
(2005).
opposed to discretionary allocation.
In Section 4, concrete policy recom-
mendations are made on how to
strengthen the rules of the EGF.
1.RETRACING THE PROS
AND CONS
The displacement of workers due
to trade, technological progress,
geographic shifts in economic
activity and other shocks is an
age-old phenomenon. And it is also
widely accepted that national
governments have a leading role to
play in assisting displaced wor-
kers with their individual efforts to
cope and to find a new job.
Therefore, when the Barroso
Commission proposed specifically
to target workers displaced as a
result of trade-related mass redun-
dancies using European funds,
this immediately raised some
serious concerns. 
A number of net contributor coun-
tries including Germany and
Sweden did not originally want to
pay for an EU adjustment mecha-
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Figure 1: Public opinion in France, US, Germany favours existing trade barriers
Source: German Marshall Fund (2006)A  BETTER GLOBALISATION FUND
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4The archive of the
news service Euractiv
(www.euractiv.com)
provides a good over-
view of the various
points of view in this
discussion, especially
around the Hampton
Court Summit in
October 2005, which
prepared the decision
to establish the EGF.
BOX 1
THE BASIC RULES GUIDING THE EGF
Size of Fund:The expenditure of the EGF may not exceed a maximum annual amount of €500 million (current pri-
ces) from 2007 to 2013.
Coverage:Support can be provided where changes in world trade patterns result in:
(a) at least 1 000 redundancies over a period of 4 months in an enterprise in a Member State, including workers
made redundant in its suppliers or downstream producers, or
(b) at least 1 000 redundancies, over a period of 9 months, particularly in small or medium-sized enterprises, in a
sector in one region or two contiguous regions.
In small labour markets or in exceptional circumstances, duly substantiated by the Member State(s) concerned, an
application for a contribution from the EGF may be considered admissible even if the conditions laid down in subpa-
ragraphs (a) and (b) are not entirely met, when redundancies have a serious impact on employment and the local
economy.
Eligible Measures:Active labour market measures designed to reintegrate redundant workers into the labour market
are eligible for support, including: job-search assistance, occupational guidance, (re-)training, certification of acqui-
red experience, outplacement assistance, entrepreneurship self-employment promotion, job-search allowances,
mobility allowances or allowances for lifelong learning and training activities, and measures to stimulate the return
to work of disadvantaged or older workers. Preparation, management, publicity, and control actives for the implemen-
tation of such programmes are also eligible. However, passive social protection measures are explicitly excluded
from funding.
Legal Basis:Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 of 20 December 2006.
nism, especially as they felt that
they already had sufficiently
developed national programmes to
deal with adjustment issues. A
related concern was that Member
States slow to implement painful
structural reforms might profit
unduly from the proposal, as their
restructuring backlog could be
expected to draw disproportionate
benefits from EGF. 
Some critics argued that the pro-
posal was primarily an expensive
and self-serving public relations
exercise of the Commission,
without any compelling economic
rationale. Other critics felt that,
even as a public relations strategy,
the EGF might backfire since its
establishment would be an implicit
acknowledgement of the adverse
consequences of globalisation.
There were fears that the EGF
might be a slippery slope towards
an expensive and bureaucratic
European welfare state run by the
European Commission. Others felt
that the EGF would be too small to
be effective, in particular because
it would be neither possible nor
necessarily desirable to distin-
guish between the relatively few
workers displaced by trade and the
many displaced by other shocks
4.
So why was it that, in spite of
these serious issues,
the EGF (see Box 1)
was adopted by the
European Parliament
and the Council of
Ministers?
In addition to the
complex quid pro quo
considerations that
are an integral part of
almost any political
decision-making pro-
cess, one political and one econo-
mic argument in favour of the EGF
seem particularly noteworthy.
Politically, a number of Member
States must have felt that the ‘good
cop/bad cop’ division of labour bet-
ween them and the European
Commission had been pushed too
far, and that this may have contri-
buted to the stalling of the EU
Constitution. According to that
view, the division of labour – with
the EU often in charge of efficiency-
enhancing but unpopular moves
towards greater liberalisation and
globalisation, and Member States
in charge of protecting their citi-
zens from the adverse effects –
needed to be adjus-
ted in the enlighte-
ned self-interest of
Member States. The
EGF might have
been a welcome
opportunity to do
just that.
From an economic
perspective, the
focus of the EGF on
workers displaced
by trade could be justified by the
fact that trade policy has in effect
been delegated to the European
level, while Member States retain
control rights to block decisions.
Consider the hypothetical example
of full trade liberalisation in texti-
les which would have greatly
asymmetric effects between, say,
Sweden, with hardly any textile
industry, and Portugal with a subs-
tantial one. Sweden would be a key
‘The good cop/bad cop
division of labour
between Member
States and the
European Commission
had perhaps been
pushed too far.’b
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5See Wasmer and von
Weizsäcker (2007) for
the technical  underpin-
nings of this brief.
6This proportion may
vary significantly
depending on the defi-
nition used for trade-
related redundancies.
beneficiary while the case would
be somewhat less clear cut for
Portugal, owing to the expected
large number of displaced workers.
Through the EGF, part of the cost of
helping displaced textile workers
in Portugal would be borne by
Sweden, thereby making full trade
liberalisation a more likely pros-
pect. And although Sweden would
be a net contributor to the EGF in
that example, it might well be a net
beneficiary of the arrangement as
a whole. While, theoretically, such
an unblocking of trade could be
achieved through a web of bilateral
transfer arrangements, in practice
such transfers hardly ever take
place and potential gains from
opening up may fail to materialise. 
Thus, in principle, an economic
case could be made for EU involve-
ment in assisting trade-displaced
workers. But does this justify the
EGF in practice? In this brief, we
argue for a streamlined and, we
believe, better EGF that could
considerably strengthen the case
for it.
2.DISPLACEMENT
HITS HARD
The term ‘displaced workers’ typi-
cally refers to those workers
whose working life has been
seriously disrupted by a redun-
dancy. Statistically, the number of
workers displaced every year can
be proxied by the number of per-
manent layoffs, namely the num-
ber of workers who do not find a
new job within the same calendar
year in which they lose their job.
Extrapolating from EU15, we esti-
mate that there are around 5.7
million permanent layoffs in EU27
per year
5.
Various studies and databases in
both Europe and the US indicate
that trade-related layoffs repre-
sent approximately 10 percent of
all layoffs
6. Furthermore, we
observe that mass layoffs repre-
sent about 10 percent of all
layoffs, according to the European
Restructuring Monitor Database.
On this basis, we arrive at a
somewhat heroic estimate of
57,000 trade-related mass layoffs
per year (see Table 1). This provi-
des a very rough order of magni-
tude of how many eligible cases
might be expected for the EGF.
With an annual spending limit of
€500m, and using this estimate,
Table 1
Very rough estimate of trade-related mass lay-offs
Category of annual job losses Estimated number of job
losses in the EU
Permanent job losses (rough estimate) 5.7 M
of which very roughly 10% trade related 570,000
of which very roughly 10% mass layoffs 57,000
Table 2
The cost of job displacements in the EU and the US
Manufacturing Non-
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
High import
competition
Manufacturing
Medium
import
competition
Manufacturing
Low import
competition
EU15 except Sweden 1994-2001
Share re-employed after two years 57% 57% 52% 59% 60%
Re-employed: mean change in earnings 0% 7% 0% -4% 3%
Share with no earning loss 46% 50% 44% 46% 47%
Share with losses greater than 30% 7% 8% 5% 7% 7%
US, 1979-99
Share re-employed at survey date (+/- 24 mths*) 65% 69% 63% 65% 67%
Re-employed: mean change in wage -12% -4% -13% -13% -9%
Share with no earning loss or earning more 35% 41% 36% 34% 38%
Share with losses greater than 30% 35% 29% 25% 25% 26%
Source: Bruegel estimates based on Kletzer (2001) and OECD (2005).
(*) The re-employment rates are not directly comparable: the US data is based on retrospective questions, while EU data is based on a panel and thus follows more
accurately a cohort of displaced workers.
Source: Bruegel estimatesA  BETTER GLOBALISATION FUND
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7Kuhn (2002).
8Source: OECD (2004).
9Lamo et al. (2006).
the EGF might therefore be able to
spend up to €9,000 per worker.
But how does this relate to the size
of the typical economic loss that a
displaced worker is expected to
suffer? Statistically, this loss can
be captured in two dimensions:
the duration of unemployment (or
the re-employment rate after a
year), and the earnings gap com-
pared to the previous job. The
unemployment effect (especially
in the EU) and the wage effect
(especially in the US) can be
serious. Evidence shows
7 higher
non-employment rates after 12
months in continental Europe (45
percent in France, 40 percent in
Germany) than in the US (24 per-
cent) or the UK (12 percent). The
re-employment rate after a year
thus differs by up to 33 percentage
points. The same source also indi-
cates substantial wage losses for
US and UK workers and no clear
pattern in continental Europe. 
Other findings (see Table 2)
confirm that large income losses
among those who take on a new
job are much more prevalent in the
US than in EU15, while the re-
employment rate seems to be
higher in the US.
Those workers who would have to
accept a significant wage cut to
find a new job are more likely to
remain unemployed in Europe
where welfare benefits are more
generous. But beyond these regio-
nal differences, there is also consi-
derable individual heterogeneity.
Being older, having a lower level of
education, longer tenure in the job
and lower-level vocational skills
makes it more difficult to cope
with displacement.
As regards tenure, workers with
more seniority are usually well pro-
tected and thus face a lower risk of
being displaced but, when they are,
they can be expected to suffer
significantly larger wage losses.
Average tenure differs widely
across countries, as well as its dis-
tribution over the cross-section of
the employed (see Figure 2). In the
UK, there is an over-representation
of tenures below three years and a
small density of tenures above 15
years, while the opposite applies in
France. This suggests that the
social cost of displacement might
be higher in a country like France
than in a country like the UK.
The ability of workers ability to
cope with structural change also
depends on initial education, with
longer and less specialised educa-
tion reducing the cost of adjust-
ment. Again, both the average
number of years of education and
the degree of specialisation of
education vary significantly. In
EU15, the average number of
years of education is 11.6, which
is about one year less than in the
US (12.7) or Canada (12.9)
8.  Italy,
Portugal, France, Spain and Greece
have the shortest average number
of years of education, between 10
and 11 years. The share of workers
with vocational education is high
in some countries (eg two thirds of
the labour force in Poland) and
moderate in others (34 percent in
Estonia)
9.   
In short, specialised labour has a
lot to lose from displacement,
either from long unemployment
spells after displacement or wage
losses. This also has political eco-
nomy implications.
3.THE CASE FOR CLEARER
RULES 
First, note that there is hardly any
difference in the fate of workers
displaced by trade and workers
displaced by other factors (see
Table 2). So why provide additional
support for trade-displaced wor-
kers and not, say, to those displa-
ced by technological shocks? 
Support for displaced workers
might simply be more effective at
freeing up trade than at removing
obstacles to the adoption of new
technologies. It is striking how, in
political decisions about trade libe-
ralisation, the topic of displaced
workers features prominently.  By
contrast, in political decisions
about adoption of new technology,
other considerations dominate:
health, environmental and ethical
concerns. Modern Luddites figh-
ting new technology for reasons of
job security hardly exist. Therefore,
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Figure 2: Distribution of job tenures in France and the UK
Source: European Household Panel Database (European Commission)A  BETTER GLOBALISATION FUND
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10Replacement rates
have been on average
around 25-30 percent
in the US and the UK,
and around 60 percent
in many continental
European countries
such as France, Spain
or Denmark (Nickell et
al. 2005). Mobility
rates are three times
higher in the US than in
Europe (eg Wasmer et
al. 2007).
11See the excellent
survey by Bassanini et
al. (2007) who findlit-
tle evidence of private
returns to training on
less skilled wokers, and
the contrasting macro
view in Bassanini and
Duval (2006), empha-
sizing the negative
correlations between
public training
expenditures and
unemployment rates.
income support for those suffering
from trade shocks might simply
offer more ‘bang for the buck’ in
political economy terms. 
If indeed a focus on trade-displa-
ced workers is justified in this way,
the question remains how funds
should ideally be allocated among
the group of trade-
displaced workers.
From a social insu-
rance perspective,
those trade displa-
ced workers hit the
hardest should
receive the most
support. But from a
trade liberalisation
perspective, funds
should be allocated
in line with protectio-
nist lobbying
strength in order to achieve freer
trade. Fortunately, these criteria
are not necessarily incompatible.
Other things being equal, those
workers who have most to lose
from trade liberalisation will have
the greatest incentive to organise
a protectionist lobby. However, the
correlation is not perfect (see
Figure 3 for an illustration), since
there are other factors determining
lobbying clout, such as geographic
concentration.
Therefore, allocation of funds on
the basis of competitive lobbying
(indicated by the red arrows) and
by objective criteria of trade expo-
sure (indicated by blue arrows)
while not yielding the same result,
nevertheless produce a somewhat
similar one. However, there is a
clear advantage in allocating
funds based on
objective criteria: it
reduces wasteful
rent-seeking activity
by affected regions
and sectors. On
balance, we would
therefore favour allo-
cation based on
objective criteria of
trade exposure.
Unfortunately, the
current rules of the
EGF leave a lot of room for discre-
tionary decision-making and the-
refore competitive lobbying. The
rules spell out neither necessary
nor sufficient conditions for gran-
ting support. Decisions on whether
funds will be granted, and how
much, will be made on a case-by-
case basis. A rather large range of
applications from Member States
has some chance of approval. But
it is not clear in advance whether
funds will be granted in any given
case, or how much. Therefore, it
would seem advisable to amend
the EGF rules, so as to provide
reliable necessary and sufficient
criteria for the allocation of funds.
4.LESS IS MORE
Displaced workers are often faced
with the unhappy choice between
unemployment, or taking a new job
that pays substantially less, or
accepting a new job far away from
home. But in the EU, those who
become unemployed traditionally
receive much more public support
than those who take a substantial
wage cut or those who agree to
uproot themselves and move
10.
With the present stipulation of the
EGF that funds must be spent on
active labour market policy,
Member States are implicitly ack-
nowledging that national policies
often suffer from this imbalance.
However, rather than attempting to
spread best practice on how to
address the imbalance, the pre-
sent delimitation of the EGF to
“active labour market policy” is
vague. For example, under current
EGF rules, unemployment benefits
are not covered, but in most coun-
tries unemployment assistance
comes with an active job-search
requirement. Thus, there might be
a temptation to label it as an active
labour market policy. Other items
such as entrepreneurial assis-
tance and training schemes are
difficult to monitor at EU level. In
particular, the track record of trai-
ning as an active job-market
policy is mixed
11.
In view of these difficulties, we
recommend to sharpen considera-
bly the profile of the EGF, focusing
its scarce resources on a limited
number of particularly suitable
active labour market policies. They
should be effective and support
displaced workers in line with their
individual exposure. They should
be transparent, simple and relati-
vely easy to monitor and evaluate.
High
Low
Low High
Trade
Lobbying
Clout
Trade Exposure
Figure 3: Stylised correlation of lobbying clout and trade exposure
‘There is a clear
advantage in alloca-
ting funds based on
objective criteria: it
reduces wasteful rent-
seeking activity.’A  BETTER GLOBALISATION FUND
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al. (2002).
13eg France: “Allocation
temporaires dégressi-
ves“ for firms with at
least 50 employees and
for which 10 employees
or more or laid off;
Germany:
“Entgeltsicherung für
ältere Arbeitnehmer” for
older workers.
The downside of a more focused
approach such as this is also clear:
the choice of Member States on
how EGF funds are to be spent in
their country would be reduced.
However, in view of the likely
advantages, this might well be
acceptable, especially if Member
States could be assured of a rigo-
rous scientific evaluation of the
EGF’s performance.
Specifically, we propose to support
just two active labour market poli-
cies: wage insurance and mobility
allowance. The wage insurance
would help those displaced wor-
kers who accepted a pay cut in
order to find a new job by paying
them a wage top-up. And a mobility
allowance would partially compen-
sate workers for the private dis-
comfort and expense of moving to
find a new job. Both schemes
directly signal the public interest
in workers accepting a new job,
rather than remaining unem-
ployed, by providing a positive
financial incentive. 
Wage insurance
Wage insurance would be provided
to every eligible dis-
placed worker who
was forced to accept
a pay-cut in order to
find a new job. We
propose that the
wage insurance pro-
gramme would pay a
top-up of between
half and two thirds of
the pay difference
between the net salary of the old
and the new job, for up to two
years. This proposal is similar to
the Alternative Trade Adjustment
Assistance, one component of the
US TAA. Indeed, a number of pro-
grammes providing sizeable wage
complements, such as the Self-
Sufficiency Program in Canada
(SSP), have been shown to be
effective labour market policies
12. 
Of course, even with a concep-
tually very simple programme like
this, a number of complex techni-
cal questions would need to be
addressed, taking the specificities
of EU27 into account. For example,
a workable and abuse-proof defini-
tion of the old and new net salary
and rules for the portability of the
wage insurance across EU mem-
ber states would have to be
agreed. A sound relationship would
need to be organised between the
proposed wage insurance and
similar schemes that already exist
in some member sta-
tes
13.  Despite these
difficult details, we
are optimistic that
not least the concep-
tual simplicity of the
scheme would
assure high visibility
and reasonable take-
up rates. 
Mobility allowance
Since immobility is partly subsidi-
sed by unemployment insurance
and other parts of the welfare
state, a subsidy for intra-EU mobi-
lity might be desirable to redress
this distortion. In fact, without an
additional subsidy
for mobility, the pro-
posed wage subsidy
might even make
this immobility dis-
tortion worse by
inciting people to
take on a lower paid
(but subsidised) job
in their home region
instead of taking on
a higher-paid (but unsubsidised)
job in a different region or country.
Therefore, we propose to introduce
a mobility allowance amounting to
two months’ previous gross pay
for job-related moves of more than
50km. For cross-border moves,
two extra months would be added
to the allowance to encourage
intra-EU mobility. Alternatively, a
reimbursement of some fraction of
the actual costs of moving might
have been considered, but this
would be much more bureaucratic
without being much more precise.
The reason is that the monetary
costs of moving are often dwarfed
by emotional and social costs,
such as the lost support from
social networks and the difficul-
ties of dependants to re-adjust.
Budgetary considerations
This raises the question whether
€500m could actually pay for the
proposed measures.
On the generous
assumption that
wage insurance
would lead to an
increase of the acti-
vity rate among eligi-
ble displaced wor-
kers from 57 percent
to 75 percent, we
estimate that
around 150,000 displaced wor-
kers could fall within the scope of
the scheme with the available
funds, with a 50 percent wage
insurance. Eligibility could thus
probably be broadened by a factor
three, compared to the current
definition of mass displaced wor-
kers. Alternatively, benefits could
be made more generous, for exam-
ple by offering wage insurance up
to two thirds of the difference bet-
ween the previous and the new
wage, effectively limiting its scope
to about 120,000 displaced wor-
kers a year. 
Scientific evaluation
Finally, a systematic ex-post eva-
luation of the use of the EGF
should be undertaken after the
first two years. For it to be scienti-
fic, individual data should be col-
lected on workers receiving the
subsidies, and on those not recei-
ving it but with individual charac-
teristics that are sufficiently close
to those of aided groups. This was
done for the Canadian Self-
Sufficiency Program and careful
evaluation on the basis of data col-
‘We propose to support
just two active labour
market policies: wage
insurance and mobility
allowance.’
‘Immobility is partly
subsidised by unem-
ployment insurance
and other parts of the
welfare state.’A  BETTER GLOBALISATION FUND
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14See Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg
(2006).
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lected has led to a relative consen-
sus on its pros and cons.
In the same way, systematic data col-
lection should be made mandatory
for the programmes supported by the
EGF and those data be made available
to the research community. The
debate generated by the resulting
independent academic studies would
ensure tight control over the pro-
gramme. In particular, such an eva-
luation would create a reassuringly
solid basis for Member States to
decide on the future of the EGF when
its funding expires in 2013.
Outlook
In the coming years, the simple
picture of who are likely winners
and who are likely losers of globali-
sation may become ever-more
fragmented due to increasing
“trade in tasks”
14.  Such a develop-
ment might also further compli-
cate the delineation of trade-rela-
ted and non-trade-related displa-
cements of workers. If the EGF
were to prove effective, it may the-
refore be conceivable to scale it up
further to meet this challenge, not
least in view of the inevitable
debate on the reform of the much
larger European Social Fund with
an annual funding of approxima-
tely €10 billion (about 20 times as
large as the EGF). And if the EGF
does not prove effective, one
should not hesitate to give the
money back to the EU budget or to
Member States.
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